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ABSTRACT This article discusses the role of the former communist party elite (the nomenklatura) in the 
Bulgarian post-communist media landscape in relation to media ownership and the origin of media 
outlets’ capital. The spotlight is on Bulgarian journalists’ perceptions explored in semi-structured interviews 
with media professionals from the capital city, Sofia. The findings indicate that Bulgarian journalists are 
strongly interested in, and concerned with, the influence of members of the former nomenklatura and 
their informal networks on the Bulgarian media landscape and particularly on the way Bulgarian media 
in Bulgaria have been owned and financed since 1989. 
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INTRODUCTION
Despite 25 years of transition and seven years of European Union (EU) membership, 
Bulgarian media and journalists have seen their freedom of opinion and expression 
gradually deteriorate with Bulgaria sliding further down the Reporters Without Borders 
World Press Freedom Index. As in other former communist countries, Bulgarian media 
ownership is strongly concentrated in the hands of powerful local media barons who see 
the media outlets they own as a convenient and relatively cheap tool for putting pressure 
on politicians and rivals with smear campaigns (kompromat) and blackmail. The effect on 
media outlets and investigative news journalism has been nothing less than catastrophic. 
This assessment of the Bulgarian post-communist media and political landscape is 
based on the perceptions of several Bulgarian journalists from the capital city, Sofia. This 
article discusses findings from 31 interviews conducted in 2009 and 2010 with Bulgarian 
journalists on one particular aspect of post-communist transformation: the role of the 
former communist party elite, the nomenklatura1, in the process of transformation of 
the Bulgarian media system, and its perceived impact on media ownership (for more see 
Trifonova Price, 2013). 
Paolo Mancini and Jan Zielonka (2012) acknowledged the need for further research 
into phenomena that are not commonly found outside Eastern Europe. For instance, they 
note that oligarchs in post-communist countries appear to be different from well-known 
tycoons elsewhere but their influence has not been sufficiently examined. Similarly, 
there is an evident lack of academic research on the factors behind the meteoric rise in 
the economic and political fortunes of Eastern European oligarchs and media barons, 
including in Bulgaria. Several scholars (Hall, 1996; Letki, 2002; Horne, 2009; Ibroscheva, 
2012) have suggested that this process was facilitated by networks of former members of 
the nomenklatura as well as by former secret service collaborators. Both were instrumental 
in the governing and functioning of the communist state. The existence of informal2 yet 
powerful networks and their clandestine activities have allegedly shaped Bulgaria’s post-
communist political and economic development as well as the development of its media 
system. As the perceptions of journalists also suggest, the presence of informal networks, 
either remaining from communism or “upgraded” to include members of the new post-
communist political and business elites, is an extremely problematic feature of the 
Bulgarian democratization process when it comes to unclear or hidden media ownership. 
The question about the origin of the funding with which media outlets were launched and 
financed after 1989 remains underexplored in the literature, and the views and perceptions 
of journalists add to our understanding of this complex issue. This article will attempt to 
answer the question: how, according to journalists, have nomenklatura networks, informal 
relationships and rules affected private media ownership in Bulgaria since 1989? To 
answer the question this article will outline the framework within which the nomenklatura 
functioned during communism, and explore its activities and behaviour post-communism. 
ͳȋͳͻͻ͹ǣͺͷ͸Ȃͺͷ͹Ȍǲ
ǡǳǤ
ʹ
ÞǯȋʹͲͲ͹ȌȂ
ǡǤ
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It will then present the methodology of the research, including participants’ details and 
data collection methods. Finally, the article will discuss the findings in relation to the role of 
the former nomenklatura in the post-communist Bulgarian media landscape.
NOMENKLATURA AND INFORMALITY
The former nomenklatura and its informal and clandestine networks cannot and 
should not be examined in isolation from the societies that they function in. Scholars 
(Grødeland and Aasland, 2007; Roudakova, 2008; Örnebring, 2012) identify a common 
feature in the majority of post-communist countries: the existence of clientelism and 
clientelistic practices, patronage and informal networks/relationships in politics, business 
and the media. In countries like Bulgaria, for example, clientelism, patronage and 
informal relationships are understood by scholars and the society in general as a mix 
of several elements: features of national culture that existed before communism, habits 
acquired during communism and a set of practices that flourished during the process 
of democratization. However, the common concept of clientelism is useful only for 
painting a broad-stroke picture of the media-political nexus (Roudakova, 2008). Previous 
research (Örnebring, 2012) has concluded that the traditional political science definition 
of clientelism does not sufficiently explain the ambiguous and complex informal 
relationships characteristic of former communist countries. Henrik Örnebring (2012) 
proposes a broader understanding of clientelism, which includes the use of media as elite-
to-elite and elite-to-mass communication tools, to establish the role of the media in the 
clientelistic post-communist systems of Eastern European countries. However, his study 
does not take into account the alleged problematic role that the nomeklatura and their 
informal networks have played in the post-communist media landscape with respect to 
how media are launched, owned, operated and used by the political and business elites. 
Scholars have attempted to examine how former communist party elites and circles 
have “transitioned” and “adapted” to the post-communist media context in other post-
communist countries such as Russia, Estonia, Poland and Hungary (Kryshtanovskaya 
and White, 1996; Borocz and Róna-Tas, 1995; Szelenyi et al., 1995; Steen and Ruus, 2002). 
However, there is an evident lack of academic research on the place, status and role of 
the former nomenklatura in Bulgaria and their informal power networks/relationships. 
To complicate matters further, Ase Grødeland and Aadne Aasland suggest that informal 
behaviour may not simply be a result of communism but “more deeply embedded 
in the national culture, shaped by historical events and social norms that are fairly 
resistant to change” (2007: 3). In other words, we must take into account the possibility 
that informal practices are a way of life rather than a coping mechanism adopted to 
deal with the restrictions of communism. Grødeland and Aasland (2007) argue that the 
presence of informality in post-communist countries can be explained by a combination 
of factors: national culture, old routines remaining from communism, and new practices 
adopted during the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, before exploring the status 
of nomenklatura after the end of the totalitarian regime in Bulgaria it is important to 
understand their place and role during communism.
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NOMENKLATURA AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP DURING COMMUNISM
The term nomenklatura evokes controversial meanings. Gil Eyal and Eleanor Townsley 
note that “the very word ‘nomenklatura’ evokes a host of dubious associations in East 
European political imagery: ‘the ruling class of the USSR,’ ‘the new grand bourgeoisie,’ 
‘counter-selection,’ ‘old corruption,’ ‘networks of patronage,’ all signifying the continued 
existence, albeit covert, of the past within the present” (1995: 723). They attempt to find 
out if this notorious group has been able to reproduce itself after the end of communism 
and their line of inquiry relates closely to claims about the destructive impact of the 
nomenklatura on the process of democratization in all former communist countries. 
Despite the fact that in all countries members of the nomenklatura were officially known, 
their precise status was far from clear. According to Eyal and Townsley (1995: 723–724), 
under communism nomenklatura could be understood loosely as an “upper class” 
which is distinguished from other classes by its dominance and monopoly of access to 
elite positions3. According to Grødeland and Aasland (2007) one of the key features of 
communism was the organisation of society into two spheres: the formal, with its stringent 
rules and regulations; and the informal, essentially a circumvention of the existing laws and 
rules. Informality4 also offered citizens a way of coping with the demands of everyday life 
through building social networks (social capital), including friendship ties and patronage. 
In Bulgaria, communist party membership was very valuable, not only for acquiring 
a high status in the party hierarchy but also for securing privileges that were unavailable 
to most people (Crampton, 1994). For those who chose a career working for the party 
in a formal or informal capacity the rewards and benefits were considerable. The 
nomenklatura in particular were served by a comprehensive and multi-layered system 
of privileges (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 1996), allowing them to have a better quality 
of life. The world of this elite constituted a different reality from which ordinary people 
were excluded5. 
Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White note that during communism one of the 
significant privileges of the nomenklatura was “the granting of state property for private 
use, in money and special services” (1996: 717). Toward the end of the regime in the Soviet 
Union, for instance, members of this elite began to conduct, and make substantial profits 
from, activities that were strictly prohibited for others. Among those activities were joint 
enterprises with Western and other foreign companies, turning party assets into cash and 
foreign currency, the issuing of advantageous credit to members at low interest rates, 
and the lucrative sale of state property at nominal prices. In other words, the communist 
party made preparations for a market environment. Economic reforms before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union were completely under the control of the nomenklatura and to their 
͵	ȋͳͻͻ͹ǣͺͷͺȌǣǡǦ
ǡǤǡǡ
ǲǳȋǤǣͺ͸ͲȌǡǤ
Ͷ
ÞȋʹͲͲ͹ǣʹͶȌǲǳǤ
ͷȋͳͻͻ͹ǣͺͷ͹Ȍǡǡǲǳ
ǡǡǤǡǡǡǡ
ǡǤȋͳͻͻʹȌ͵
ͳͻͺͲǤǡ
ǲǳȋǡʹͲͲʹǣʹ͵ͳȌǤ
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direct material benefit. Despite their focus on Soviet Russia, Kryshtanovskaya and White’s 
(1996) claims can be applied to most communist states, including Bulgaria. The authors 
assert that the revolutions of 1989 were, in effect, a change of actors, in which the younger 
generation of the nomenklatura simply ousted its older rivals. The change also involved 
a redistribution of political power to a group of more economically savvy and pragmatic 
nomenklatura members, many becoming prominent politicians, oligarchs and media 
owners throughout Eastern Europe. Where the transitions were peaceful, the former 
rulers easily converted their political capital into economic assets and social status (Steen 
and Ruus, 2002).
NOMENKLATURA AND NEW ELITES POST-COMMUNISM
Throughout Eastern Europe the demise of the communist system left an intricate, 
nationwide web of social relations that survived mostly as informal ties (Róna-Tas and 
Böröcz, 2000)6. During communism, the loss of a position in the ranks of the nomenklatura 
usually meant an end to a political career but this changed in the years after the 
transformations began; former members remained influential members of national elites. 
Eyal and Townsley argue that the new post-communist elites “are the inheritors of the 
social organization of the nomenklatura under Communism” (1995: 745). Eric Hanley, 
Natasha Yershova and Richard Anderson also note: “the power of these individuals 
appears to be rooted not in the institutions over which they preside but rather in the 
personal networks that link them to other members of the old nomenklatura” (1995: 662). 
It is well known that personal connections were vital for the operation of the socialist 
economy and society as a whole. More importantly, however, the links established during 
the communist regimes became extremely valuable in the post-communist era too. Ivan 
Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi (1995) observe a general agreement among scholars in the 
region that the process of privatization in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s benefited the 
communist political class most, which remained at the top of the class structure without 
many constraints. As they put it: the old guard was hardly in trouble in Eastern Europe 
(Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995)7. 
With regard to the former Soviet Union, Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996: 723), for 
example, compare the newly established Russian elite (by the mid-1990s) to a “three-
layered pie”. Politicians and their circles of allies are at the top, continuously competing 
for power; in the middle sit the businessmen who provide essential funds for electoral 
campaigns, lobbying, newspapers and TV. The bottom, but very important, layer consists 
͸ԜǤ
ǡǣ
Ǥ
ǲǳȋ×ǦÚÚǡʹͲͲͲǣʹʹͶȌǤǦ
ͳͻͻͲ×ǦÚÚȋʹͲͲͲǣʹʹ͵Ȍǲ
Ǧǯ
ǳǤ
͹ȋͳͻͻͺȌǡ
Ǥ
Ǥǲǳȋǡͳͻͻͺǣͳ͸͸ȌǤǦ
ǲ
ǳȋ
ǡʹͲͲͲǣͷͶȌǤ
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of the former security services whose role is to “maintain order but also act as a means of 
influence and contract enforcement” (ibid.). Similarly, the Bulgarian former secret services 
ensured that the revolution of 1989 posed no threat to the former nomenklatura and 
especially not to those who had served as spies and agents. Unlike in other East-Central 
European countries, in Romania and Bulgaria the political transition has been marked by 
the active role of the former secret services and their foray into the ruling and opposition 
parties. In Bulgaria semi-mafia structures were endorsed by the secret services and the 
state has not been able to deal with this problem. The privatization processes were in 
both countries manipulated in favour of powerful local actors while foreign investors 
were kept at bay (Andreev, 2009). In the media sphere this is particularly visible: foreign 
investors did not arrive until the mid-1990s and a number of them have exited the market 
in recent years.  
According to Elza Ibroscheva (2012) controversial figures that had collaborated with 
the communist regime own some of the most influential Bulgarian media outlets. The 
former spies’ unique position in the media, for example, gave them unprecedented access 
to media resources like printing and broadcasting facilities, as well as access to substantial 
capital that was out of the reach of ordinary Bulgarian citizens. Cynthia Horne (2009: 349) 
notes the widespread cronyism of the former spy network and its continued influence on 
Polish society as highly problematic: the richest Polish businessmen today had extensive 
contacts with the security services prior to 19898.
It is important to stress that elite members of the communist nomenklatura controlled 
– either directly or indirectly – the vast majority of state property and enterprises as well as 
strategic government offices, at least at the start of the transition in Bulgaria. They operated 
personal networks that provided them with information, influence and resources resulting 
in a privileged access to the new market9. As Jozsef Böröcz and Akos Róna-Tas argue (1995: 
755–756), the high degree of “informality-intensity” of East European post-communist 
economies makes informal social networks essential in determining economic outcomes. 
It was the existence of “widespread, extremely sophisticated and discriminating systems 
of informal networks of actors” that cut across the boundaries among formal economic 
institutions. Even if they were no longer active party functionaries, ex-cadres were said 
to reap the benefits of their insider knowledge and personal social networks by acting as 
intermediaries among key segments, institutions, and actors of the new market economy.
ͺ
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Horne (2009: 349) argues that throughout Eastern Europe “informal understandings 
and unwritten agreements between current political elites and former elites in positions 
of economic power have created widespread perceptions that the transitions were 
unfair and incomplete”. In Romania, for example, those perceptions are “fuelled by the 
pervasive belief that the people who contributed to the previous totalitarian regime 
continue to obtain legal and business advantages, with 80% of Romanians polled thinking 
that corruption levels grew or stagnated even after joining EU [in 2007]” (Horne, 2009: 
363). Most of the research and literature discussing the transition and the influence of 
former nomenklatura networks on post-communist societies focuses on transitional 
justice (Welsh, 1996; Letki, 2002; Szczerbiak, 2002; Williams, 2003; David, 2004; Williams 
et al., 2005; Horne, 2009; Zake, 2010). The role of the former nomenklatura in the post-
communist media landscape needs to be investigated, especially in relation to the origin 
of the funds with which private media outlets were launched or purchased. The majority 
of those who own media in Bulgaria, it is argued, consider it more important to own a 
media outlet as such rather than make a profit as this kind of media ownership is not 
profit-oriented but supports other political or corporate ambitions. 
Vicken Cheterian (2009) and Martha Dyczok (2009) – among others – demonstrate that 
in many post-communist countries oligarchs, politicians and even notorious crime figures 
emerged as the dominant elites and media owners, ensuring the visibility in the media 
of certain issues, parties and leaders sympathetic to their goals of long-term survival in a 
highly volatile environment. Unclear, non-transparent media ownership has plagued the 
Bulgarian media landscape from the start of democratization and the true identities of the 
owners of most media outlets are yet to be scrutinized. 
BULGARIAN JOURNALISTS’ PERCEPTIONS
This article is based on the findings of a larger study, which examined the perceptions, 
opinions and understandings of a group of journalists who were asked to reflect on the 
changes that have taken place in the Bulgarian media system post-communism. The 
study relied on anonymous semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 31 journalists 
from the capital city Sofia, most of whom are considered to be influential figures in the 
media sphere (Table 1).
Table 1. Sample of interviewees
N = 31 
* One interviewee was in a managerial position (media group) but is a former senior journalist at the 
Bulgarian National TV (BNT) and also worked freelance.
Broadcasting              Press                                Web/online   Freelance/Former/
Radio TV               Daily Weekly Magazine
6 6 6 5 1         2                         5* 
Semi-retired
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The bulk of interviews (25) were conducted in 2010 after a pilot of 6 interviews took 
place in 200910. The majority of the participants (27) had direct journalistic experience in 
the media prior to the end of the communist regime in 1989. The oldest nine interviewees 
began a career in the 1950s and 1960s while eight others started in the 1970s. 18 journalists 
embarked on a journalism career in the 1980s while the remaining four participants began 
working as journalists post 1990. A characteristic shared by the 27 participants is that they 
have worked continuously in the Bulgarian media since 1989 in positions ranging from 
junior reporters, editors-in-chief and senior TV/radio producers and directors (Table 2).
Table 2. Age group and years of working as a journalist 
N = 31
The interviews comprised 22 questions examining journalists’ views and opinions 
on issues that the literature on post-communist media systems observes as common 
limitations to Bulgarian journalism during the process of democratization. In the course 
of the research an unexpected gap in the literature emerged on the former nomenklatura 
networks and their role and influence on the Bulgarian post-communist media landscape. 
Nevertheless, the findings of pilot interviews suggested that the issues of nomenklatura/
former party elite as well as the problematic topic of the journalist-spy in the media 
appeared in answers to other questions. Using semi-structured interviews allowed a 
considerable degree of flexibility for both the researcher and the participants in exploring 
unexpected issues and angles that came up in interviews. One of the clear advantages of 
anonymous semi-structured interviews was that they allowed a wealth of information to 
be collected from a number of prominent figures in Bulgarian media without risking their 
identification. The protection of the identities of the 14 men and 17 women who took part 
in the study was unconditional. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The consensus among participants is that most Bulgarian media outlets were bought 
specifically to serve certain agendas and to represent particular political and business 
interests. Ownership of a media outlet is perceived as an important tool for exerting undue 
influence on politics, business and society. This is the main reason why non-transparent 
or hidden ownership is seen as hugely problematic by the majority of interviewees, 
who note the lack of an effective register of ownership for private media that clearly 
names the true owner of each media outlet. Several interviewees state matter-of-factly 
that the real owners of the bulk of private Bulgarian media are hidden behind offshore 
companies or behind “fronts”, such as lawyers. Serious worries are raised not only about 
the hidden owners of media but also about the true origin of capital that has financed 
ͳͲǡ    ǡͷ ǦǦ
ǡǤ
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new publications, cable and TV channels since the 1990s. There is a noticeable concern 
about the identities of the people who launch media companies, particularly about the 
“murky” and “dubious” role played by the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP)11 and the 
former nomenklatura, who are perceived as desperately trying to change their image and 
distance themselves from their repressive past. 
There is a belief that just like in the former Soviet Union, the Bulgarian Communist 
Party had made preparations for its future survival. This quote illustrates the view well:
It was clear that what happened on November 10, 1989 was “directed” by the leading party or actually 
certain people and fractions within the party, who wanted to transform their political power, which was 
not enough for them, into economic power. So somewhere in the “laboratories” of the Secret Services, 
they created the model of the Bulgarian transition, the Bulgarian “democracy”, as we have seen it over 
those years. It was an orchestrated transition, which later impacted on the country's development and the 
model of democracy that was established here. (Senior producer at a private TV channel) 
Several participants assert that in the final stages of communism, the former 
nomenklatura made preparations for change by siphoning party funds abroad to secret 
foreign bank accounts; this resonates with claims made in the literature. Following the 
collapse of the regime, those clandestine assets are believed to have been reinvested in 
private enterprises and used to purchase or finance media outlets. Many journalists claim 
that the capital illegally stashed away overseas was being poured back into new business 
opportunities in Bulgaria, especially in rigged state property privatization. These claims 
are supported by reports issued by organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. At the time both organizations reported that Bulgaria’s assets 
were being depleted systematically through dubious and non-transparent privatization 
deals (Everaert et al., 1999). 
According to several journalists control over media was part of the nomenklatura’s 
carefully designed strategy to remain in power after 1989. Some participants even 
suggest that by allowing unprecedented freedom of expression and a variety of new 
publications, the former communist leadership ensured that the public would have an 
outlet to express long-held frustrations and grievances toward the oppressive regime, 
thus preventing violent repercussions. While seemingly far-fetched, such claims were not 
completely unfounded, especially in the case of the former Soviet Union. The literature 
suggests (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 1996; Steen and Ruus, 2002) that the communist 
party nomenklatura did not simply vanish but secured the economic and, to a large 
extent, political survival of the majority of its members. This, however, was achieved at 
the expense of ordinary citizens and has, according to several journalists and scholars 
(Hellman, 1998), affected Bulgaria’s process of democratization. 
After decades of rumours, speculation about media ownership and half-hearted 
attempts at tracing the origin of the fortunes of some of the most notorious Bulgarian 
political and business figures with proven links to the communist regime, several 
participants express a strong desire for a thorough investigation. More importantly, 
ͳͳȋȌǤ
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however, journalists want to know how those fortunes have been deployed in the media 
since 1989. One journalist sums up the prevailing attitude when saying that there are only 
three main questions that should be asked about Bulgarian media outlets: “Where does 
the money come from, are they complying with professional standards and is there a 
conflict of interests?” (Senior TV producer at BNT).
Interviewees are clearly convinced that such pressing questions will neither be asked 
nor answered by any Bulgarian government. Despite Bulgaria’s obligation to fulfil its EU 
accession criteria, the prevalent secrecy and deception in media ownership have not 
been adequately addressed. The problem is exacerbated, according to several journalists, 
by the existence of complicated “networks of vested interests”, which are concentrated 
and visible in the media. Several journalists claim that a number of media outlets were 
launched with the sole purpose of “laundering money” or “settling scores” with political 
and business rivals12. Other participants note that many newspapers do not follow the 
market logic in its usual sense (i.e. supported by income from advertising or a paying 
audience). However, such newspapers continue to be published year after year because 
informal political and business networks would like to have an outlet “just in case they 
need them at one point or another”. Seemingly unlimited and highly dubious funding 
allows media to exist without making a profit, even if, as one participant notes, they are 
“haemorrhaging money”. 
The problem of unclear ownership and funding appears to have its roots in the early 
period of Bulgarian democratization. Journalists believe that in the early 1990s, despite 
some profound changes in the media landscape (such as the introduction of private 
ownership and a new language and style of press reporting), a clear continuity with the 
past existed, with senior media personnel retaining leadership positions. This, in turn, 
fuelled speculation by the general public and among journalists that they stayed in those 
positions to protect the former nomenklatura’s interests and to facilitate its easy transition 
into capitalism. Such beliefs are supported by media experts. For instance, in one of its 
reports, the organization Reporters Without Borders states: 
Bulgaria has evolved from a strong communist regime to a modern feudalism, but without any real 
change of actors. The former oligarchy invested massively in the privatisation of the Bulgarian economy at 
the start of the 1990s and took control of all the key sectors such as energy, construction, natural resource 
management, transport, telecommunications and real estate. (Reporters Without Borders, 2009)
The situation in the media is similar, and according to the report it is not uncommon to 
find former high-level party and security officials or former intelligence officers managing 
media outlets.
Informal arrangements remained intact and thriving, put in place solely with the 
purpose of advancing personal agendas. The continuity of actors in the media sphere, 
especially in the early years of democratization, combined with unclear press ownership 
ͳʹ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created the perfect conditions for the nomenklatura to remain anonymous, yet powerful 
behind the scenes. Most media outlets in Bulgaria are perceived as “servants” or “weapons” 
with which to smear, attack, blackmail or intimidate opponents of the alleged owners 
and their informal political, business and in some cases criminal networks. This opinion 
illustrates the view well: 
It’s a major problem because when someone tells you something, you have got to see who's telling you 
this, and when the ownership of the media outlet is not clear, and when you see biased publications in 
them and specifically against someone, not following basic journalistic standards, then you can be sure 
that the media are used as weapons. (Newspaper reporter)
A similar trend is observed in Russia where, according to Cheterian (2009: 213), post-
Soviet pluralism is the pluralism of the oligarchs and the media do not serve the public 
interest but instead act as the “voice of a very small fraction of the rich and politicized 
elites”. While several journalists concede to a limited degree of media freedom in Bulgaria, 
most express serious concerns about the fact that the political, business and media 
elites understand media freedom as a carte blanche to employ any method, without 
any restraint or responsibility, to promote private, political and corporate agendas. 
The majority of participants point out Bulgaria’s deteriorating media freedom rankings 
awarded by organisations such as Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Despite the diplomatic 
language of the reports, the interviewees understand the rankings as a true reflection of 
the dismal state of media freedom in Bulgaria.
Journalists perceive Bulgaria, and especially the capital city Sofia, as a relatively small 
place with only “two degrees of separation” where politics and business are conducted 
on the basis of informal agreements and exchanges of favours. Media are an important 
part of this arrangement: they help the elites stay in power, some of the media that they 
secretly own include the most popular TV channels, such as bTV and Nova TV. Several 
interviewees insist that if the origins of the real owners’ money were traced then it would 
become quite clear where and how they became so wealthy and could buy not only one 
outlet but, for example, a large chain of media outlets in print and broadcasting.
The questionable alliance between business, politics and crime figures has grown 
stronger over the years since the demise of the communist regime. The journalists believe 
that most oligarchs, wealthy entrepreneurs and politicians owe their vast fortunes and 
status to the former communist regime and its repressive secret service apparatus. The 
increase in clientelism in Bulgaria since 1989 shows that despite positive and constructive 
steps in the process of democratization, to a large extent the negative trends in the 
development of the Bulgarian media system are a result of political, economic and societal 
culture, deeply rooted in communism. Habits, informal rules and friendship networks are 
slow to change. However, it should be noted that despite a tendency to view this group as 
an ambiguous and faceless collective, journalists do not blame the former nomenklatura 
and party elite for all issues and problems that Bulgarian media struggle with. Far from 
making such claims, participants recognise that several factors, including newly emerging 
actors and trends in the post-communist media landscape, have contributed to negative 
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developments in the Bulgarian media system. Anton Steen and Jüri Ruus (2002) suggest 
that communist ideology is history which will not re-surface and this view is echoed by 
Bulgarian journalists. However, the recent communist past and elites associated with 
it are still perceived as powerful undercurrents in the political and media spheres. The 
scarcity of hard evidence tying former regime supporters to new rulers after the end 
of communism and to specific issues that stem from this alliance does not render these 
perceptions credible. Nevertheless, those views should not be dismissed entirely as they 
indicate a problem that has not been adequately addressed for many years.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of journalists’ perceptions indicates a problematic omnipresence of 
informal nomenklatura networks at the start of the Bulgarian transition. Participants 
believe that the “reformed” communist party elite that was privileged in the past preserved 
its immune status in the new post-communist political and business environment. To 
some extent scholars validate those perceptions13. 
The influence and power of such extended and fluid networks of political and economic 
actors, including semi-mafia organizations, is precisely what journalists are concerned 
about. What participants and scholars agree on is that the continuity of informality, including 
clientelistic practices, patronage and friendship networks have lasted despite attempts at 
transformation and establishment of democratic institutions. Most participants believe 
that the communist legacy has partly endured into post-communism through the still-
functioning (yet sophisticated) covert networks of former party and secret service officials. 
This “unholy alliance” is seen as impacting adversely on the establishment of the post-
communist Bulgarian media system straight from the beginning of the transformation. 
Hidden media ownership and the unclear origin of funding that was (and still is) used to 
launch and finance media outlets are especially problematic. The former nomenklatura are 
seen by many as being at the root of those problems.
The dominant model of governance, now firmly entrenched in Bulgaria, breeds 
nothing but disillusion, apathy and cynicism toward the state, erodes trust in institutions 
and crushes faith in the ongoing process of building a democratic society. Using 
interviews with Bulgarian journalists, this article has demonstrated an existing belief 
that nomenklatura networks are partly responsible for the bleak state of media freedom 
in Bulgaria.
At the onset of changes sweeping through Eastern Europe, Antony Levitas and Piotr 
Strzałkowski warned: 
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The transformation of the nomenklatura into a class of capitalist owners could be devastating for the 
prospects of Polish capitalism. As we have noted, there is little reason to overestimate the entrepreneurial 
talents of the apparat, and where there are talents, many of them have been used for years not to maximise 
on markets, but in the corridors of state power. Allowing the nomenklatura to acquire state property en 
masse makes it extremely likely that all the worst forms of socialist clientelism will be perpetuated within 
the framework of a very lopsided and stagnant capitalism. (Levitas and Strzałkowski, 1990: 415)
When writing about the process of decommunization in Eastern Europe, including 
disqualification of actors complicit with old regimes, retribution and restitution, Claus 
Offe sums up a widespread argument for adopting transitional justice procedures such as 
screening laws. He argues that “the people in question, their attitudes and competence, 
and the networks of solidarity existing among them, would constitute a threat to the 
orderly functioning of the new democratic regime if they were allowed access to important 
political, administrative or professional positions” (1997: 93). 
Needless to say, such warnings by scholars were disregarded. The process of 
decommunization and transitional justice was mostly slow and ineffective in Bulgaria. 
There is little doubt that most journalists perceive the members of former nomenklatura 
and their allies, the secret services, as a threat to the Bulgarian democratization process, 
as well as a corrosive influence on its media system. While those perceptions seem 
exaggerated at times and lack detail, the evidence presented by scholars supports the 
views of participants on the adverse impact that unaccountable forces such as the secret 
services and semi-mafia structures have on crucial democratic reforms (Andreev, 2009). 
Without any doubt, new “entrepreneurs-cum-mafiosi” have generated large private 
returns while maintaining partial economic reforms at a considerable cost to society 
(Hellman, 1998: 233). This negative influence extends to the Bulgarian media sphere. The 
pressing concerns expressed by journalists specifically about the media relate to: a) hidden 
media owners’ unscrupulous use of their position to “launch assaults” and pose limits on 
media freedom in order to advance their personal, corporate and political ambitions and 
b) the origin of capital used to launch or purchase media outlets, especially by former 
nomenklatura members and their links with the secret services. 
The evidence demonstrates that non-transparent media ownership is the result of the 
legacy of the communist past and of the lingering habit of directing and controlling the 
media, combined with the introduction of private ownership post 1989 and the effects 
of rampant, or so-called nomenklatura, capitalism. A mix of old and new political and 
corporate cultures manifests itself in sophisticated methods of employing media outlets 
as a vehicle for political and business agendas. According to participants, twenty-five years 
after the revolution of 1989, it is high time that questions about the origin of capital with 
which media outlets were founded, their owners and the role of the former nomenkaltura 
were addressed. Further research is urgently needed to explore the precise composition 
of old and new elites, taking into account the role of the former secret services, their 
informal relationships and the makings of the post-communist oligarch. In combination, 
these phenomena have proved lethal to Bulgaria’s continued efforts at democratization 
and building a transparent media system. 
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NOVINARSKA PERCEPCIJA 
UMREŽENOSTI NOMENKLATURE 
I MEDIJSKOG VLASNIŠTVA 
U POSTKOMUNISTIČKOJ BUGARSKOJ
Lada Trifonova Price
SAŽETAK U članku se istražuje utjecaj bivše elite komunističke partije (nomenklature) na bugarske 
postkomunističke medije u kontekstu vlasništva medija i podrijetla medijskog kapitala. Kroz polustruk-
turirane intervjue s medijskim stručnjacima iz bugarske prijestolnice Sofije ispituje se prije svega što 
bugarski novinari misle o tome. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju na to da bugarski novinari pokazuju veliki 
interes, ali i zabrinutost, za utjecaj članova bivše nomenklature i njihovih neformalnih veza na medijski 
sustav u Bugarskoj. Osobito su zabrinuti zbog načina na koji se bugarski mediji financiraju i u čijem su 
vlasništvu od 1989. godine.
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